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51 Introduction
This Report investigates the potential for a statutory model of
employment retention leave. A Private Members Bill (HC Bill 2006-
07) [79] currently in progress through Parliament would, if enacted,
offer disabled employees the right to paid leave for employment
assessment, rehabilitation or re-training.
‘It is illogical to support disabled people to get off benefits
and into work whilst allowing those who develop a
disability to be laid off with a pension or forced onto
incapacity benefit – this helps neither the worker, the
company nor the country – everyone loses’.
(John Robertson MP, speech to the House of Commons,
13 March 2007) 1
Employment retention leave is paid time off work arising from an
individual’s impairment.2 It is aimed at those individuals where there
is an onset of an impairment and/or where they have an existing
impairment but there is a deterioration in their condition. The duration
of the absence from work will vary, from a few hours to several
months. The leave may be periodic or continuous.
Employment retention leave is necessary because the likelihood of
someone leaving employment is increased following the onset of
disability. The proportion of individuals who remain in employment
after the onset of disability is known to fall over time (Burchardt,
1 Hansard 2006-07, Col. 156-157
2 Also known as Rehabilitation Leave or Disability Leave.
62003b:9). Although the evidence is limited, analysis of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) suggests that the onset of disability
is linked with a reduction in employment from 81 per cent two years
before onset to 36 per cent two years after onset. (Bardasi et al,
2000:2) Moreover, 5 per cent of individuals who become DDA
disabled leave employment almost immediately, rising to 13 per cent
after nine to twelve months, representing around 1 in 5 of all those in
employment who become DDA disabled (Burchardt, 2003b: 11).
The employment penalty for disabled people has shown a substantial
increase since the 1970’s (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2007:12), and
their persistent employment disadvantage is well documented:
disabled people are 30 per cent more likely to be out of work than
non disabled people with similar characteristics (for example, age and
qualifications) (Equalities Review, 2007).
The use of employment retention leave benefits employers,
employees and the Government, and is clearly linked with broader
policies to enable more people to engage in paid work. The strategy
document Health, work and well-being – Caring for our future A
strategy for the health and well-being of working age people argues
that one outcome of a successful strategy should be the opportunity
for ‘people with health problems or disabilities to optimise work
opportunities’ (DWP, DH, HSE, 2005:27).
Critically, the absence of a statutory employment retention leave
scheme means that:
7‘… it [will] be exceptionally difficult to increase the
percentage of disabled people in employment, as each
year numerous people who could return to work if their
condition was understood and treated as disability rather
than sickness end up claiming benefits or drawing on their
pension schemes before retirement age instead.’
TUC, 2006:19
It is estimated that raising the employment rate of disabled people to
that of the general population across the EU would raise the overall
EU employment rate between two and three per cent (European
Commission, 2004).
Methodology
In compiling this Report, we carried out a review and analysis of
existing literature and policy documents. We also conducted
telephone interviews with employers, insurers, and members of a
disability support group. Employers were selected on the basis of
having a commitment to retaining disabled employees. The research
sought to identify and evaluate a model of employment retention
leave; to explore potential funding mechanisms for this leave, and to
examine the ease with which employment retention leave could be
implemented.
81.1 Employment retention and the Disability
Discrimination Act
Under the Disability Discrimination Act, employers have a duty to
make ‘reasonable adjustments’ for disabled staff when a ‘policy or
practice or a physical feature of their premises, places the disabled
person at a substantial disadvantage’ (DRC, 2007). Employment
retention leave would constitute a ‘reasonable adjustment’ under the
terms of the Act. Indeed, the leave itself provides a period of time
during which both employer and employee can make necessary
reasonable adjustments. These may include adjustments to working
arrangements, adjustments to premises, or adjustments to the job
(HSE, 2007) (Annex 1)
The Disability Discrimination Act states that a person is disabled if
they have ‘a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial
and long-term adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day to
day activities' (see Annex 2).
2 Current practice
2.1 National/international policies
In the UK over half (52 per cent) of employment establishments have
a (formal or informal) policy covering the rights of disabled employees
and applicants (Roberts et al., 2004:38-39). Not all of these
businesses will have a policy on employment retention leave.
Indeed, an internet search using the terms ‘disability leave’ and
9‘rehabilitation leave’ suggest that only a minority of firms have paid
leave arrangements for employment retention purposes.
However, a number of trade unions, such as UNISON and the Public
and Commercial Services Union, have model agreements that
members can use in negotiations with employers, and a survey of
1,221 workplaces in the UK carried out by the TUC in 2002 found that
12.5 per cent of employers surveyed offered a ‘rehabilitation service’,
and 9 per cent offered some form of additional paid leave for
rehabilitation, stress or disability (described in the Report as
‘recuperative leave’) (TUC, 2002:6).
National surveys show that in the UK, in just over eight out of ten
workplaces where disabled people have ever been employed,
adjustments have been carried out (83 per cent in Roberts et al.
(2004:60) and 84 per cent in Simm et al. (2007:64)). In over half of
establishments this included flexible working time or varying hours for
disabled employees (55 per cent in Roberts et al. (2004:57) and 56
per cent in Simm et al. (2007:64)). Indeed, Simm et al. point out that
these adjustments are often referred to as ‘disability adjustment
leave’.
There is a lack of consistent definitions of disability and collection of
statistical data; and from an international perspective, legislation and
practice with regard to rehabilitation of employees who are absent
because of sickness varies. Nevertheless, some countries (notably
Australia, North America and Scandinavia) have a statutory
requirement that all companies with 20 or more employees have
rehabilitation policies and procedures in place. These must be
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implemented when an employee has been absent due to sickness for
more than four weeks (Higgins, April 2007).
Employers in Sweden are required to ensure that any rehabilitation
needs are analysed as soon as possible, and to undertake measures
for effective rehabilitation of employees, while employers in the
Netherlands must submit a report of work incapacitated employees to
a social security agency within 13 weeks and must also submit a
‘work resumption plan’ (James et al., 20024).
In some countries in Europe, an employer’s responsibility for
continuing to pay employee wages during sickness absence is seen
as promoting both absence prevention and employee retention
measures. In the Netherlands, for example, employers are liable for
wages during sickness absence for a year (with some exemptions).
In Denmark and Norway, more people enter vocational rehabilitation
and training than are granted disability benefits, and it is argued that
although statistics are not always amenable to international
comparison:
‘The data suggest that even the highest average per capita
costs will pay off in the medium term should (the) vocational
intervention result in successful labour market reintegration.’
(OECD, 2003:112).
2.2.1 Ireland
The Republic of Ireland has one of the most generous schemes to
support employment and employment retention of disabled
employees. The Wage Subsidy Scheme (WSS) offers financial
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support for employers in the private sector who employ some people
with disabilities for at least 20 hours a week. Employers can access
one or all of these schemes. There are three strands to the scheme:
i. Strand 1 subsidises employers of staff with ‘proven productivity
rates’ of 50-80 per cent, and is designed to cover a productivity
shortfall. The maximum subsidy is €8,295 per annum. For a
disabled employee with a productivity level below 50 per cent of
normal work performance, there is a maximum subsidy up to
€10,323 per annum. The amount of the subsidy varies depending
on the number of hours per week the disabled employee is
employed. WSS does not affect the equal employment rights of
disabled employees.
ii. Strand 2 applies where a company employs more than two
disabled people, and includes a grant to cover the additional
supervisory, management and other work related costs, based on
the number of disabled employees employed. The grant has a
sliding scale from an additional 10 per cent of wage subsidy for
three to six disabled employees to a maximum of 50 per cent of
wage subsidy for more than 23 disabled employees.
iii. Strand 3: an employer of 30 or more disabled workers can claim
a grant of €30,000 per annum towards the costs of employing an
Employment Assistance Officer.
Additional support for employers in the Irish Republic includes:
 Employee Retention Grant: A two stage grant enabling employers
to identify adjustments and or training to enable a disabled
employee to remain in their work, or to re-train the employee to
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enable them to take up another position in the company. Stage 1
funds 90 per cent of the costs of developing a retention strategy
(to a maximum of €2,500 per annum), enabling employers to ‘buy
in’ external skills and knowledge; Stage 2 provides funding at 90
per cent of eligible costs (to a maximum of €12,500 per annum), to
enable employers to implement their retention strategy, including
employee re training.
 Workplace Equipment Adaptation Grant (WEAG): Payable to
private sector employers for adaptation of the workplace or
equipment. Up to € 6348.70 for minor building modification and
assistive technology. The grant can also be used to upgrade
equipment previously funded under the WEAG scheme.
 Disability Awareness Training Support Scheme: Open to all
companies in the private sector. Training grants are available for
the development of personnel at all levels and occupations within
this sector. The purpose of the grant is to enable companies to:
 Employ or retain people with disabilities;
 Promote the employment of people with disabilities;
 Promote the management of diversity within the workplace.
Funding for the Scheme is available to companies at a level of 90
per cent of costs in the first year and 80 per cent of costs in
subsequent years. The maximum funding available to a company
is €20,000 in any one calendar year.
 Policies to help disabled employees to access the labour market
include a job interview/interpreter grant for jobseekers; a Personal
Reader Grant for employees with a visual impairment, and a
Supported Employment Programme for disabled jobseekers (FAS,
n.d.).
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2.2.2 Company/employers’ policies
Recent survey evidence describes some of the perceived barriers
that employers say prevents the employment and retention of
disabled people (Vision Twentyone, April 2007). These include
anxiety about the language and terminology around disability, and
misunderstanding about disability in general, and the employment of
disabled people. However, at company level, an increasing number
of employers are engaged in developing ‘Disability Confidence’. This
is a relatively new concept, developed by the Employer’s Forum on
Disability, to inform and enable companies to meet the needs of both
their workforce and customers. The Employer’s Forum describe the
‘building blocks’ of disability confidence as having strategic,
commercial, legal, societal, ethical and professional benefits.
‘Traditional cost-benefit analysis focuses unduly on the
assumed costs of accommodating individuals. By contrast
the disability confidence business case includes aspects
such as the enhanced management capacity and
organisational performance, which are usually overlooked.’
(Employers Forum on Disability, 2007)
The Employer’s Forum argues that there is a good business case for
a proactive approach to meeting the needs of disabled employees,
and this is reflected in the policies and procedures of many
organisations. However, there is some variation in levels of ‘disability
confidence’ at company level; particularly in smaller companies,
although the situation is improving (Lam et. al., 2005). However,
recent research evidence demonstrates that larger establishments,
both in the public and voluntary sector, are more likely to have a
wider understanding of disability, to have made adjustments, and to
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have a more positive attitude towards disabled staff (Simm et al.,
2007:6).
Examples of this proactive approach have been identified by the
research team, and are included here. Salford City Council, for
example, operates a Disability Leave Scheme (DLS). This provides a
newly disabled employee, or a disabled employee whose condition
has deteriorated, with up to six weeks off work:
‘to adjust to the change in personal and professional
circumstances. During this period of leave, the employee
is able to assess their disability or condition and how it
affects their job role, bridging the gap between sickness
and a return to work. The employee’s job is protected
whilst on the DLS to give both the employee and their
manager time to seek professional help to adapt to the
new circumstances.’
(Salford City Council, 2006)
The Disability Leave Scheme is in addition to other policies on the
employment of disabled people. The costs to the Council are seen
as low when compared with the benefits, and the Council’s policy
document on Disability Leave states that ‘very few’ employees have
used this scheme.
Lloyds TSB also takes a highly proactive approach towards
employing disabled people, and ensuring that employees who
become disabled are able to remain in employment. Subject to
meeting the policy criteria disabled employees are allowed to take
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‘Reasonable Adjustment Absence’, which is a period of paid absence,
(or partial absence) from work. Reasonable Adjustment Absence can
be taken when:
 An employee is confirmed by their GP as being able to work
 They are prevented from carrying out their role because
they are awaiting a specified ‘reasonable adjustment’ to their
workplace
 That adjustment is essential to the effective performance of
their role.
(Lloyds TSB Disability Resource Toolkit)
The company employs external case advisers, and make full use of
the Access to Work Fund where appropriate. The consultants
recommend Access to Work (AtW) assessments, which are
undertaken by Disability Service Teams (DST) which are part of
Jobcentre Plus. These assessments are free. Specialist
assessments (for example, occupational health, adaptive
technology/IT or psychiatric or impairment specific assessment) may
be recommended by either the case advisers or Disability Service
Team, and these are funded by the company. Again, very few
employees have taken Reasonable Adjustment Absence.
The company has a strong commitment to rehabilitation, with clear
policies which include a Reasonable Adjustment Process; a Personal
Development Programme (PDP) for disabled employees; Mentoring
and Career coaching for disabled employees, and Disability
Awareness Training, which is available for all staff. Finally, Lloyds
TSB has a Group disability network, AXIS, which is ‘owned’ and run
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by disabled employees. AXIS provides support and networking
opportunities for disabled employees, raises awareness of disability
as an issue (for all employees) and creates an environment in which
employees are able to disclose their disability, thereby enabling them
to ‘own’ and manage their ‘disability issues’.
Other examples of organisations that are developing, or have a
commitment to developing, employment retention policies, include the
Halifax Bank; the Scottish Courts Service; Scottish Power, and
Sheffield City Council (TUC, 2002:15) and Kingfisher plc (which
includes B&Q).
2.2 Employment retention leave and the benefit /tax
system
2.2.1 Differences between Statutory Sick Pay and paid
employment retention leave
In practice, it can be difficult to make a clear distinction between
‘sickness’ and ‘disability’ (TUC, 2006:19). Further, there are
drawbacks to the current system; for example, a period of phased
rehabilitation is ruled out during sick leave, because of a potential
effect on sick pay and benefits (DRC, 2007). The introduction of a
statutory employment retention scheme will involve a formal decision
about the individual’s entitlement to the leave by an employer that
may be informed by a medical assessment and where appropriate
will involve paid employment retention leave.
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Employment retention leave is not granted to cover sickness
absence; it is a paid absence that arises from a disability and not
sickness. Formally, employment retention leave should be counted
separately from sick leave and should not be used to cover period of
‘sickness’. Accordingly, those on employment retention leave would
not be in receipt of Statutory Sick Pay.
Paid employment retention leave would apply to people deemed
disabled under the Disability Discrimination Act, whereas Statutory
Sick Pay is payable to employees aged 16 and over and under 65
who are ‘incapable of work’ for 4 or more consecutive days. The
individual must also have a contract of employment with an employer
and earn enough to pay National Insurance contributions.
Some of the key differences between the paid employment retention
leave proposed in this report and Statutory Sick Pay are outlined in
Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Key differences between paid employment retention leave and Statutory Sick Pay
Aspect Paid Employment Retention Leave Statutory Sick Pay
In-scope
population
People defined as disabled under the
Disability Discrimination Act
Employees with an incapacity to work
Eligibility criteria Employees aged 16 and over who are
capable of work but who require further
assessment, treatment and / or
rehabilitation. Individual must have a
contract of employment.
Employees aged 16 and over and under 65
who are ‘incapable of work’ for 4 or more
consecutive days. The individual must
have a contract of employment with an
employer and earn enough to pay National
Insurance contributions. In addition,
people may be treated as incapable of
work for the purposes of Statutory Sick Pay
under certain circumstances, for example,
when under medical observation because
of contact with an infectious disease and a
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Medical Officer of Environmental Health
has issued a certificate excluding the
person from work.
‘Certification’ Leave approved by a manager/employer.
May involve a medical assessment
Self-certification for first 7 days, then
‘reasonable medical evidence’ usually a
sick note from a GP.
Maximum period Will vary depending upon circumstances.
Duration of employment retention leave
must be ‘reasonable’
28 weeks. If an employee continues to be
sick after the maximum liability of 28
weeks, then s/he can claim Incapacity
Benefit.
Consecutive
days
Employment retention leave need not be for
consecutive days. It could be for (parts of)
single days, blocks of days/weeks or
periods of part-time working.
Employees must be ‘incapable of work’ for
4 or more consecutive days. Periods of
incapacity for work up to the 28 week
maximum can be linked where a new
period is separated from the previous
period by less than eight weeks.
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Link with
occupational
sick pay
Not applicable Payments made under an occupational
health scheme count towards a person's
SSP entitlement. If the occupational sick
pay scheme pays less than the full SSP,
the employer must make up the deficit.
Other benefits Employment retention leave is not available
to people receiving Statutory Maternity Pay,
Maternity Allowance or (other) national
insurance benefits. However, recipients
may claim: Income Support, Housing
Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Disability
Living Allowance, industrial injury benefits
and bereavement benefits.
SSP is not paid to people receiving
Statutory Maternity Pay, Maternity
Allowance, Statutory Paternity Pay,
Statutory Adoption Pay or (other) national
insurance benefits. However, recipients
may claim: Income Support, Housing
Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Disability
Living Allowance, industrial injury benefits
and bereavement benefits.
Deductions Paid employment retention leave is treated SSP is treated like pay and so is taxable
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like pay and so is taxable and liable for
National Insurance contributions, and
deductions can be made for pensions,
student loans and attachment of earnings
orders
and liable for National Insurance
contributions, and deductions can be made
for pensions, student loans and attachment
of earnings orders
Hospitalisation If employee was hospitalised they would be
on sick leave and not employment retention
leave.
Does not affect payment of SSP
Disputes Employment Tribunal5 Dealt with in first instance by HMRC
5 Our qualitative work suggests that employers who have proactive policies around employment retention would generally work to
avoid a situation reaching the Employment Tribunal stage.
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2.2.2 Links with incapacity-related benefits
People without entitlement to Statutory Sick Pay/occupational
health pay (such as the self-employed) and those who entitlement
to these benefits has come to an end may claim Incapacity
Benefit. Recipients of Incapacity Benefit are incapable of work
during a ‘period of incapacity for work’.
Under the present system, Incapacity Benefit is paid at three rates:
 Lower short term rate (£61.35 per week) is paid for the first 28
weeks of entitlement and is mainly claimed by those not entitled
to Statutory Sick Pay, such as the self-employed.
 Higher short term rate (£72.55 per week) is paid after 28 weeks
of entitlement – someone whose entitlement to Statutory Sick
Pay had expired and was still incapacitated could claim this
rate.
 Long term rate (£81.35 per week) is paid after 52 weeks of
entitlement.
Incapacity Benefit is paid for each day someone is incapable of
work during his or her ‘period of incapacity for work’ (that is, a
period of four or more consecutive days; or two days for people
having plasmapheresis, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, regular
weekly kidney dialysis or total parenteral nutrient). However,
Incapacity Benefit, like Statutory Sick Pay, is generally not paid for
the first three days of a period of incapacity for work.
Incapacity Benefit, except for the short term lower rate, is taxable.
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Some Incapacity Benefit recipients continue to have a contract of
employment – even if their entitlement to Statutory Sick
Pay/occupation sick pay has ended. This means that an
incapacity benefit recipient could still hold discussions with their
employer about returning to work (as shown in Figure 3.1). These
discussions could be facilitated by a Jobcentre Plus’ Disability
Employment Adviser or a Incapacity Benefit Personal Adviser or a
represented of an employment service contracted provider (for
example, a Job Broker adviser under New Deal for Disabled
People or an adviser in the provider-led Pathways to Work
programme).6 If the discussions were successful the individual
could move from Incapacity Benefit to paid employment retention
leave as part of the process of a return to employment.
Where private or voluntary sector providers are involved there is a
concern that outcome-related funding regimes may have perverse
effects that disadvantage job retention (Kennedy and Wilson,
2006:54-55). Outcome-related funding regimes tend to reward job
entry and so providers may favour benefit recipients who are more
‘job ready’ and/or they facilitate entries to jobs that are unsuitable.
This can be militated against by funding schemes that reward job
placements that are sustained for a specified period of time (say,
13 weeks or longer), as well as paying for job entries. With
respect to the employment retention leave proposals outlined here,
outcome-related funding may mean that more difficult job retention
cases are not pursued because the costs to the provider exceed
6 Pathways to Work has been extensively piloted and is due to be rolled-
out nationally in 2008. The Government intends that private and
voluntary sector organisations have a key role in the delivery of Pathways
to Work.
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the payment they might receive, and/or they are not interested in
such cases because the individual has a contract of employment
and no job entry payment can be achieved. RNIB will need to
monitor the terms and conditions of providers’ contracts awarded
by Jobcentre Plus.
Employment and Support Allowance
Under the Welfare Reform Act 2007, Incapacity Benefit and
Income Support on grounds of incapacity will be replaced by a
new benefit, the Employment and Support Allowance, which is a
replacement of earnings benefit with contributory and means-
tested components.
People may be entitled to Employment and Support Allowance by
satisfying
either National Insurance condition conditions (similar to
those for incapacity benefit) or a means test (similar to
Income Support);
and
a ‘limited capability for work test’ that shows that their mental
or physical condition limits their capability for work to the
extent that it would be unreasonable to expect them to work.
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The ‘limited capability for work test’ will be conducted during an
initial 13 week ‘assessment phase’.7 A second test will be
conducted during this 13 week period to determine whether their
limited capability is such that it would be unreasonable for the
person to engage in ‘work-related activities’. Decisions on the
‘limited capability for work’ and ‘limited capability for work-related
activities’ will be based on medical evidence provided by
claimants, their General Practitioners and DWP doctors.
Employment and Support Allowance has two tiers: the support
component and the work-related activity component. The former
comprises those assessed as having a limited capability for work-
related activity. The latter consists of those assessed as not
having a limited capability for work-related activity and they will be
subject to ‘work-related conditionality’, which initially will comprise
work-focused interviews, but this provision could be extended to,
for example, agreeing an action plan and even rehabilitation-type
activities. Claimants who refuse to undergo the assessments or
follow any set work-related activities without good cause face a
benefit sanction.
In the context of employment retention leave, a key issue is the
extent to which the Employment and Support Allowance’s
assessments and work-related activities complement and support
employers own practices. On the one hand, DWP regulations and
procedures need to be sensitive to the fact that, as employees,
claimants may have already had a medical assessment and
7 Regulations may specify conditions where this assessment phase may
last for more than 13 weeks.
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discussions with their employer that are effectively about ‘work-
related activities’. The employee-claimant may find it intrusive,
even unnecessary, if they are asked to participate in a series of
assessments that appear to cover essentially the same issues.
On the other hand, it is important that employers do not see the
introduction of a 13 week assessment period as a reason for not
conducting and funding their own assessment of the employee’s
work-related needs. RNIB should consider whether a single
assessment process is both desirable and feasible. Such an
assessment would need to involve a range of stakeholders such
as social services, employers, NHS and DWP.
Conceivably, a recipient of the work-related activity component of
Employment and Support Allowance who still has a contract of
employment could receive Jobcentre Plus and/or contracted
provider support with discussions with their employer. As with
Incapacity Benefit, these discussions could lead to employment
retention leave and/or other reasonable adjustments as part of a
return to work strategy. However, the concerns about outcome-
related funding mentioned above also apply to the new
Employment and Support Allowance.
2.2.3 Working Tax Credit
Working Tax Credit is an in-work benefit designed to ‘make work
pay’ for those in low paid employment. It is paid to people who are
in receipt of Statutory Sick Pay/occupational sick pay, so arguably
people on employment retention leave should be eligible for
Working Tax Credit.
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Working Tax Credit is paid to people who are employed or self-
employed (either on their own or in a partnership), who:
 usually work 16 hours or more a week
 usually live in the UK
 are paid for that work (that is, voluntary work is excluded),
and
 expect to work for at least 4 weeks
and who are
 aged 16 or over and responsible for at least one child, or
 aged 16 or over and disabled, or
 aged 25 or over and usually work at least 30 hours a week
Disability element
Working Tax Credit comprises several elements, including
additional amounts for people with a disability. If not already in
receipt of the credit/disability element, the impairment that leads to
the employment retention leave may give entitlement to the
benefit. To qualify for the disability element, the claimant (or
partner) must usually work for at least 16 hours per week and:
 have a mental or physical disability that puts them at a
disadvantage in getting a job; and
 to have been in receipt of certain benefits.
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Further details about Working Tax Credit and the disability criteria
can be found in HMRC (2005a and 2005b).
2.2.4 Access to Work
The Access to Work Fund is recognised by disability rights groups
and many employers as a valuable resource to support the
engagement of disabled people in employment (Simm et al., 2007;
RNIB, 2004). Recent research evidence suggests that Access to
Work is particularly useful for small to medium sized businesses
that do not have access to internal specialists or the resources to
pay for external advice. However, the research found that
although employers did not find cost a major barrier, smaller
establishments were often ‘suspicious of cost implications’ (Simm
et al 2007:158) and Access to Work can provide crucial support to
employers and disabled employees. Our qualitative research
found that Access to Work also makes an important contribution to
employment retention for large employers.
However, the scheme is still not well publicised. In 2002, 74 per
cent of employers did not know of the existence of Access to Work
(RNIB, 2004), and a key recommendation of this research is that
the scheme needs to be given a higher profile. According to a
recent TUC report, the lack of publicity for the Access to Work
Fund has led many disabled people to suspect a ‘deliberate
intention to ration the scheme through ignorance’ (TUC, 2006b: 6).
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3 What would an ideal model look like?
This chapter outlines a hypothetical or ideal model of how
employment retention leave could be implemented. It is
recognised that this model will not apply in all circumstances or to
every case of disability onset; nonetheless it provides a starting
point for discussing the practicalities of its introduction.
3.1 The Process
The granting of employment retention leave will be part of a wider
process that explores the full range of reasonable adjustments that
an individual may need in order to secure their continued
employment. A wide range of people may be involved in the
process; in addition to the disabled worker and representatives of
the employer the process may involve medical professions
(including the individual’s own doctors and those with training and
experience in disability assessment), lawyers, representatives
from insurers, and staff from Jobcentre Plus.
Figure 3.1 provides a high-level view of the underlying process,
which involves at least three primary stages:
 an injury or illness that leads to a (worsening) impairment
 a discussion between the employer and employee about
employment retention and what ‘reasonable’ adjustments are
required (which may include a period of paid leave for
rehabilitation purposes)
 an outcome that might include employment retention.
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Figure 3.1 The employment retention leave process
Employment retention
Impairment
Sick
leave
Defined as DDA
disabled
Employer – employee discussion(s)
Employment
Assessment
Employment
retention leave
Other reasonable
adjustments made
Return to work
Incapacity-
related benefit
claim
Exit from labour
market
Medical
Assessment
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As Figure 3.1 shows, there are a variety of routes by which an
individual may secure employment retention leave. It could be
initiated when the employee is identified as being a disabled person
within the terms of Disability Discrimination Act 2005; something that
could happen pre- or post-recruitment. Some employees may have a
pre existing disability, which they have chosen not to disclose to their
employer, while others may not have previously considered
themselves to be disabled. The realisation that the employee may be
classed as disabled under the Act may or may not follow a period of
sick leave. Indeed the employee may have ceased entitlement to
Statutory Sick Pay/occupational sick pay and claimed incapacity
benefit, even taken the employer to the Employment Tribunal to
establish that they are a disabled person under the Act (this link is not
shown in Figure 3.1). In any event the worker holds discussions with
(a representative of) the employer about their impairment and work-
related needs. The employee may or may not have a third party
(such as a trade union representative) present at these discussions.
The Disability Rights Commission’s guidance for Trade Unions
suggests that if a person’s absence through sickness is clearly
disability related, it is good practice for employers to consider
reasonable adjustments at that point, for example through allowing a
disabled person to have more time off, or providing other support
(DRC, 2006).
The process of accessing employment retention leave commences
with a discussion between the employee and the employer or their
representative (i.e. line manager). This would always be in
conjunction with an employment assessment, during which any
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reasonable adjustment could be identified (including employment
retention leave). It is the employer who sanctions paid employment
retention leave. This employment assessment would be a
requirement for any employee wishing to access employment
retention leave. Similarly, any employee requesting redundancy
because of disability would be required to undertake an employment
assessment. The only circumstance in which an employment
assessment would not be required would be where this had already
taken place, and a ‘repeat’ assessment would represent an
unnecessary duplication.
In determining whether to grant employment retention leave the
employer may also request that the employee undergoes a medical
assessment or provides (further) medical evidence. Employees who
cannot give reasonable grounds for refusing an assessment are, in
practice, unlikely to be given employment retention leave.
Research evidence suggests that the optimum time for effective
rehabilitation is between approximately one and six months into a
period of absence, and that later interventions mean that obstacles to
a return to work are more complex, and therefore harder to
overcome, making rehabilitation both more difficult and more costly
(Waddell et al, 2004). It is vital that the employer-employee
discussions and any assessment provide the worker with easy and
early access to relevant rehabilitation services (Better Regulation
Task Force, 2004: 31-33):
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‘In order to be successful rehabilitation has to occur promptly
after an injury or illness has occurred.’
(Better Regulation Task Force, 2004:33)
The total duration of the employment retention leave will vary and
depend upon individual circumstances. The estimated duration of
each leave period will need to be negotiated between the employer
and employee (TUC, 2006:20). Local agreements with trade unions
may incorporate a maximum total period for employment retention
leave per annum. An alternative approach, which more closely
reflects the Disability Discrimination Act, is that the total duration must
be ‘reasonable’, where this is defined in terms of the criteria outlined
in the Act and the code of practice (DRC, 2004).
Whilst the individual is in receipt of employment retention leave, any
other reasonable adjustments could be carried out.
(For completeness, Figure 3.1 also shows that there are other
pathways for people returning to work without having employment
retention leave. These are shown to highlight that employment
retention leave must be seen as part of a wider system for facilitating
employment retention).
3.1.1 Independent assessment
In some (but not all) instances the worker may by referred for an
independent ‘assessment’. Either the employer or the employee
could formally request an assessment, but if both parties agree, there
would be no reason for employment retention leave not to commence
immediately; that is, the request for an assessment should not delay
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the leave.8 The assessment must be conducted as quickly as
possible after it has been requested, and in any event within three
months (see BICMA, n.d.). The assessment could be conducted
before (where an impairment is known about in advance), during or
after a period of sick leave (APIL, 2004:4).
The aims of the assessment could include:
 Making a recommendation on whether employment retention leave
was appropriate and, if so, an estimate of its frequency and
duration;
 Identifying what other ‘reasonable adjustments’ might be
appropriate; and
 Possible referral to other services, which may include a medical
assessment.
The assessment is not designed to determine the cause of the
impairment, nor the worker’s longer term needs for medical treatment
or care (see BICMA, n.d.).
Depending upon circumstances (for instance, where both parties
agree in advance about the nature of the impairment) the assessment
could be conducted by a Disability Employment Adviser.
The assessment could be conducted at the employee’s home, or at
the assessor’s place of work. In certain circumstances, the
assessment could be conducted over the telephone (APIL, 2004:4).
8 One large employer interviewed for this research operates a process of
employees’ self-defined impairment related absence.
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Medical assessment: Employment assessment and medical
assessment are separate processes with the latter being optional.
Depending upon the worker’s circumstances a medical assessment
may involve their General Practitioner, consultant, a medical adviser
or occupational health adviser appointed by the employer. The
Bodily Injury Claims Management Association (BICMA, n.d.)
guidance is that (see also APIL, 2004:3):
‘It is essential that the process of assessment and
recommendation be carried out by those who have an
appropriate qualification (to include physiotherapists,
occupational therapists, psychologists, psychotherapists and so
forth). It would be inappropriate for assessments to be done by
someone who does not have a medical or other appropriate
qualification. Those doing the assessments should not only
have an appropriate qualification but should have experience in
treating the type of disability from which the individual claimant
suffers.’
The worker may have to give their permission for their medical
records to be shared with others.
The report on the medical assessment could cover:
‘1. The injuries sustained by the claimant
2. The claimant’s present medical condition (medical conditions
that do not arise from the accident should also be noted where
relevant to the overall picture of the claimant's needs)
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3. The claimant's domestic circumstances (including mobility,
accommodation and employment), where relevant
4. The injuries/disability in respect of which early intervention or
early rehabilitation is suggested
5. The type of intervention or treatment envisaged
6. The likely cost
7. The likely short/medium-term benefit to the claimant’
(BICMA, n.d.)
Item 5 above could include a specific recommendation on the
appropriateness of employment retention leave as well as other
reasonable adjustments.
Both employer and employee should receive copies of the
employment and any medical assessment report. The employer
and/or the employee may query its findings, and any related
correspondence with those undertaking the assessment must be
copied to the other party.
Employers should be obliged to take into account any report based
on the assessments. Given that the Disability Discrimination Act
requires employers to make ‘reasonable’ adaptations, if they reject
any recommendations for employment retention leave or other
reasonable adjustments they should be required to give the worker a
statement in a suitable format giving the reasons for their decision.
Similarly, the worker should not be obliged to undertake any of the
recommendations, but, like the employer, should be required to
formally inform the employer of their reasons for rejecting any
relevant recommendations in the report.
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Assessments raise a number of issues including disclosure and the
payment for the assessment (see Section 7.4).
3.2 Potential activities during employment retention leave
Individuals on employment retention leave could be involved in one or
more of the following activities:
i. Continuing contact with employers
During employment retention leave, continued contact between
employer and employee would be an important element of
employment retention policies. Contact could include support, training
and development, and constructive work-related activities where
appropriate. These would have an important role in promoting
employee retention. Access difficulties may need to be identified and
addressed to support this strategy; the leave would allow employers
and employees to discuss and negotiate other reasonable
adjustments.
Evidence from employees on sick leave suggests that they value
continued contact with their employer. Generally, people on sick
leave believe that line managers should initiate contact.
Nevertheless, this contact should be sensitive, rather than intrusive,
and different levels and frequency of contact may be appropriate for
different people in different situations (Farrell et al., 2006).
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ii. One to one support including:
 Counselling
 Mentoring
 Advocacy
iii. Work-related support, including:
 (re-)Training
 Graduated or phased return to work
 Keeping in Touch days (KIT days)
Similar to the Maternity Leave model; Keeping in Touch days can be
used for work or any other activity that enables an employee to keep
in touch with his or her work environment, including, but not
exclusively, attendance at conferences, appraisals, or team meetings.
Keeping In Touch days are not the same as the reasonable contact
that employers may continue to have with employees during periods
of leave, because employees can work for their employer during
Keeping in Touch days. This work is not covered by an employees’
normal contract of employment and is paid by the employer. Work
would not have to be over whole days, but a shorter period (of, say
three or four hours) would count as a full Keeping in Touch day.
Employees would continue to be paid during employment retention
leave for the weeks that they engage in Keeping in Touch days.
iv On-going medical interventions including (taken from Better
Regulation Task Force, 2004:32):
 acute medical attention;
 accurate early assessment and diagnosis;
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 pain relief;
 physical therapies (chiropractice, podiatry, physiotherapy,
osteopathy, complementary therapies etc);
 wider therapies (e.g. speech therapy);
 ergonomic support;
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4 Funding models
This chapter outlines some general models for funding employment
retention leave. The advantages and disadvantages of each model
are summarised in an associated text box.
4.1 General assumptions
Under all models, employers and employees would continue to have
liability for National Insurance contributions.
The amount of paid for employment retention leave would be the
same as Statutory Sick Pay so that neither employers nor employees
have any financial incentive to move/not move from Statutory Sick
Pay to employment retention leave earlier than they would otherwise
do so if there was a differential in the two payments.
People in receipt of paid employment retention leave would not be
able to claim Statutory Sick Pay or Incapacity Benefit/Employment
and Support Allowance. They would, however, be able to claim
Disability Living Allowance and Working Tax Credit as well as
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit.
4.2 Models
There are three main models:
 State benefit
 Private provision
 Mixed funding
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4.2.1 State benefit
Here paid employment retention leave like Incapacity Benefit is a
welfare benefit provided by the State. There are two versions of this
funding model:
 Paid employment retention leave would be a contributory benefit
and entitlement depends in part upon an individual meeting
National Insurance contributory conditions. Underpinning social
insurance is the contributory principle. However, in recent years
successive Governments have moved away from the notions of
social solidarity that underpin social insurance and favoured social
assistance schemes that, through means-testing, allow them to
target help on those most in need.
Advantages of the contributory principle
The advantages of the contributory principle include (not in any
order of priority):
 Equitable provision – arguably only those at risk of needing a
replacement income should fund a social insurance scheme
from which they might benefit. This does not preclude
notional contributions, but does mean that non-beneficiaries
should not pay for benefits which they are not potentially
entitled
 Comprehensive coverage – it can encompass employees,
employers and the self-employed
 Simplicity – it is an easy to understand principle
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 Assurance of security – contributors know that if the
appropriate contingency arises they have some entitlement to
financial assistance
 Promotion of self-esteem – it avoids the stigma associated
with social assistance as people believe they have taken
steps to protect themselves and consequently take-up of
contributory benefits is better
 Ease of administration – unlike means-tested benefits the
income of the claimant and any other members of a
household does not have to be established, the employment
retention leave would be paid regardless of household income
 Reinforcement of the value of paid work through contributors
gaining entitlement to a ‘social right’ – it maintains a link
between the labour market and the contingency when a
replacement income is required
 Flexibility in policy – the principle is compatible with various
other possible policy objectives, such as poverty alleviation,
protection of living standards, etc.
 Avoidance of the need to means test benefits.
Disadvantages of the contributory principle
The main disadvantages are (not in any order of priority):
 Exclusion of certain groups - non-contributors who might need
a replacement income through paid employment retention
leave can be excluded from benefit receipt. Ultimately, it is a
matter of political judgement as to whether certain groups who
could require a replacement income should be excluded from
a social insurance scheme. Nevertheless, women because
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they are disproportionately represented in lower paid jobs are
more likely than men to be excluded from social insurance by
the lower earnings limit. Moreover, the self-employed paying
Class 2 contributions are not entitled to the full range of
contributory benefits, and this could include employment
retention leave
 Incompatibility with the demands of a flexible labour market –
the payment of contributions assumes full-time continuous
participation in paid employment. The increase in temporary,
part-time and self employment limits people’s entitlement to
social insurance
 National Insurance contributions are effectively a
hypothecated tax on labour and so may depress employment
levels
 Perceived complexity - the complexity of the National
Insurance scheme can make it difficult to understand
(Stafford, 1998) especially for the self-employed (Corden,
1998)
 Lack of transparency – there is a lack of public awareness of
what people receive in return for the payment of National
Insurance contributions (Corden, 1998; and Stafford, 1998)
 Paid employment retention leave is a social assistance benefit
paid for through general taxation. The advantages and
disadvantages of employment retention leave as a means-tested
benefit are essentially the opposite of those outlined for the
contributory principle.
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There is a third option whereby paid employment retention leave is a
hybrid benefit having a contributory and income based components,
as with Jobseeker's Allowance. With Jobseeker's Allowance, people
can receive the benefit for up to six months as a contributory benefit
and then as a means-tested benefit. Those with insufficient National
Insurance contributions receive the income based version of
Jobseeker's Allowance from the outset. A similar arrangement could
apply to employment retention leave.
4.2.2 Private provision
Employment retention leave could be funded privately, rather than by
the State. There are at least two versions of this funding model:
 Employers bear the cost of employment retention leave, which
they could insure against if they wished. The insurance policies
could also cover the cost of other payments such as those for the
medical assessment, although our qualitative work suggests that
full use of existing support (including Disability Employment
Advisers and the Access to Work Fund) could lessen the overall
burden on employers.
Employers Liability Compulsory Insurance is designed to meet the
costs of legal fees and compensation if an employee becomes ill
or is injured at work through the fault of the employer (Employers
Liability Compulsory Insurance Act 1969, unless exempt). Our
qualitative work also suggests that suitable insurance could be
included as an additional element of employer’s existing
insurance, (although cover for medical insurance and income
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protection insurance tends to be expensive).9 This would place
paid employment retention leave on the same footing as Statutory
Sick Pay. Within this model there are two further options:
o Full salary payable by employer
o Part salary payable by employer with a top-up either via private
insurance by the individual or by the State (say Working Tax
Credit)
Advantages
 Costs to the Government/taxpayer are minimised. To the extent
that the employment retention leave reduced the flow on to
Incapacity Benefit there is a real benefit saving
 Gives employers a further (financial) incentive to promote health
and safety at work and follow best practice in sickness absence.
 The employer full salary payment model is possibly the only model
that minimises claims for benefits such as Housing Benefit and/or
Council Tax Benefit
Disadvantages
 Employers are less likely to hire people with a health condition or
impairment if they believe that the condition or impairment is likely
to deteriorate as they will then incur costs
 Adds to employers’ labour costs, and will increase the financial
pressure on some firms so that they hire fewer people. Scheme
could disproportionably affect small and medium sized firms
9 See also http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/
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 Individual pays the insurance premium. This could be a separate
employment retention leave policy or combined with, say private
healthcare/medical insurance, permanent health insurance, or
critical illness protection.10 Policies would need to include the cost
of medical assessments. It is not clear if they should also include
a sum to help with workplace adaptations/rehabilitation costs.
Advantages
 If voluntary scheme: Allows individuals the choice of whether or
not to take out an insurance policy
 Could be tax efficient for individuals, conceivably employees could
receive tax relief on premiums or the benefit paid could be tax free.
Disadvantages
 Benefit may be paid as a lump sum that is inadequate to cover
actual costs of an assessment and provide an income for the
period of the employment retention leave
 No clear financial incentive for employers to undertake reasonable
adjustments to the workplace (other than the Disability
Discrimination Act)
 Added household expense especially for the low paid
 Distrust of private sector provision – whilst people may be content
with their existing occupational and private pension provision, there
is concern that private insurance for incapacity and unemployment
can offer poor value for money (Stafford, 1998). In particular,
insurance policies can be seen as too expensive, with
10 Some employers offer PHI to their employees either free or at a reduced
charge.
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administrative charges and commission fees believed to be too
high
 If compulsory – in current political climate would be seen as a
‘hidden’/’stealth’ tax and politically unpopular
 Certain conditions will be excluded and this will leave people
without adequate protection. Some policies will not pay unless the
policyholder cannot do any occupation, and so would be
unsuitable for funding employment retention leave
 Low take-up
 If voluntary scheme - Information asymmetries mean that those
who might expect to benefit (e.g. those with a health condition that
could be expected to deteriorate) would take out a policy. Insurers
may require potential policyholders to undergo a medical
examination before granting a policy
Premiums would be higher in certain industrial sectors such as the
construction and mining industries.
A further difficulty with the privately funded model is that:
‘… if rehabilitation is provided before liability is established for an
injury or the full extent of an injury is known, then in the long run it
may be difficult to establish who should pay and whether the early
treatment provided was correct.’
(Better Regulation Task Force, 2004:34)
It is important that under any privately funded scheme individuals
receive the employment retention leave and any associated
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assessment and rehabilitation support promptly, rather than after
waiting to sort out who is ‘paying’ (BRTF, 2004:34; APIL, 2004:4-5).
Otherwise the effectiveness of the scheme in helping people retain
their employment is comprised.
4.2.3 Mixed scheme
In this model, provision would be mixed. This could be similar to
Statutory Maternity Pay, for example, which is contingent on
individuals meeting National Insurance requirements, but is also part
funded by the employer. Large employers recover 92 per cent of the
costs of Statutory Maternity pay, (105 per cent if they are small
employers), from Inland Revenue.
Statutory Maternity Pay is paid for 39 weeks. The rules are fairly
complex, but broadly speaking, Statutory Maternity Pay is paid at 90
per cent of average weekly earnings (if this is less than £112.75) with
a lower earnings limit of £84 per week before July 14th 2007, and £87
after that date.12 To get paid maternity leave of 39 weeks, employees
must have worked continuously for the same employer for 26 weeks
by the 15th week before the child is due, (the ‘Qualifying week’) and to
have worked during the ‘qualifying week’ (for all or part of the week)
Workers who do not meet the criteria for Statutory Maternity Pay,
including the self-employed, may claim maternity allowance, paid
12 Women who are classified as ‘workers’ (rather than employees) are not
entitled to Statutory Maternity Pay, but may be entitled to a Maternity
Allowance.
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through Jobcentre Plus, at the rate of £112.75 for 39 weeks. To be
entitled to Maternity Allowance, women have to have worked for 26
weeks during the 66 weeks immediately before the qualifying week.
These 66 weeks are known as the ‘test period’, and a woman has to
have earned at least £30 a week for 13 weeks at any time during the
test period, or have pre-tax earnings of £87 a week (that is, above the
lower earnings limit) in the 8 weeks before the qualifying week.
Advantages
 Reduction in recruitment costs
 Retention of skilled employees (the best employers achieve up
to 90% ‘return to work’ rates) (E O C, 2005:7)
 Statutory scheme – covers all female employees
 Costs shared
 Disadvantages
 Requires flexible and proactive approach from employers
 Lower earnings limit would disadvantage some employees
 Additional costs to employers (from covering posts, loss of skills
and experience during the absence, management and
administrative time)
 Costs to employers can be relatively high for SMP (between
£5k and £7.5k per annum) and may be problematic in a micro
business (with fewer than 10 employees) (EOC, 2005)
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5 Costs and Benefits
5.1 Evidence on Costs and Benefits
Although there are a number of businesses that have employment
retention leave policies and procedures in place, there is scant
evidence of the actual monetary benefits and costs of the scheme
(Paschkes-Bell, 1996), or indeed, more generally of retaining
disabled employees (Hasluck, 2006:87-88). Hasluck (2006:87-88)
outlines possible reasons for the absence of robust monetary data on
the costs and benefits of employing disabled people:
 Surveys often ask about costs and benefits of the typical or
average case and consequently fail to capture the wide variation in
costs and benefits to employers.
 Some surveys ask for estimates in qualitative terms or for
responses to pre-specified monetary bands, rather than for precise
quantitative figures.
 Some employers, for a variety of reasons, do not record data on
the costs of employing disabled people.
These reasons undoubtedly apply to the current study and help to
explain the lack of ‘hard’ financial data on costs and benefits of
employment retention leave schemes. In addition, like (Paschkes-
Bell, 1996), the research team found that the firms contacted have
not systematically monitored the monetary gains and losses of the
scheme.
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Given this lack of monetary information this report outlines the items
that might be expected to give rise to a benefit or cost. The benefits
and costs of employment retention leave are incurred by different
groups of people, who may have different perspectives on whether a
given item is a benefit or a cost. For example, the Government will
perceive any reduction in expenditure on incapacity-related benefits
as a benefit, but the individuals concerned may see a fall in benefit
income as a cost (albeit one offset by a salary). Accordingly, this
chapter lists the benefits and costs of employment retention leave
from four perspectives:
 the employee perspective;
 the employer perspective;
 the Government’s perspective; and
 the private insurer’s perspective.
The sum of these four perspectives gives the overall societal
perspective.
5.2 Employee perspective
Some workers develop a (more serious) impairment and as a
consequence are at increased risk of redundancy or pressure to take
early retirement on grounds of incapacity. Leading up to these
‘forced’ exits from employment, workers can face periods of sickness
absence, when in fact they are capable of work, and periods of
reduced (half) pay. In summary, not providing employment retention
leave ‘can lead to long-term absences, loss of self-confidence and
even job loss, with the common difficulty of getting back to work
again.’ (DWP, DH, HSE, 2005:19).
52
Employment retention leave would mean that the worker would know
that their employment is reasonably secure and that they will continue
to receive pay; this should reduce levels of stress that might
otherwise hinder their return to work.
In summary, the benefits and costs to employees are as follows:
Benefits:
 Avoids job loss
 Depending upon funding arrangements may mean a higher
earnings (compared to income from any benefits)
 Continued membership of any occupational / private pension
scheme, and so should give higher income in retirement vs.
moving onto benefits and leaving pension scheme
Psychological and health benefits of being in work, in particular
minimises any fall in levels of self-confidence and self-esteem
Costs:
 Employees continue to pay National Insurance contributions. (In
contrast, those in receipt of Incapacity Benefit would receive
National Insurance credits)
 Insurance premiums to cover costs of employment retention leave:
Depends upon funding model – it could be paid by employer,
employee or Government (see Section 4.2)
 Increased costs associated with working (for example, travel or
childcare costs). However, costs may be offset by Access to Work
or by employer
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 The (leisure) time people must give up when they go to work. The
monetary equivalent of this leisure time forgone is possibly not
less than a quarter of earnings (Bell and Orr, 1994; Greenberg,
1997, and Greenberg and Robins, 2005)
5.3 Employer perspective
The principal benefit to employers of employment retention leave is
that it retains the individual in employment so securing their
‘accumulated skills and experience’ and avoids the costs or
recruitment and training new staff.
Benefits:
 No redundancy pay (assuming the employment retention leave is
successful)
 No pay in lieu of notice (assuming the employment retention leave
is successful)
 Reduced salary while on reduced pay (assuming that employment
retention leave pay is less than ‘normal’ salary)
 Reduced employer's National Insurance contributions while on
reduced pay (assuming that employment retention leave pay is
less than ‘normal’ salary)
 Reduced Statutory Sick Pay while on employment retention leave -
but this is potentially offset by cost of employment retention leave,
which might be the same as Statutory Sick Pay – so cancelling
one another
 Perceived by employees and customers as a good employer who
promotes equal opportunities. This could encourage loyalty and
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commitment from employees – boosts staff morale. Signals to the
workforce the value the business places on employees (Hasluck,
2006:97)
 Business may be seen as more representative of the community;
and could avoid costly disability discrimination cases
 Retains employees with (valuable) experience and skills
 Avoidance of costs incurred in recruiting a replacement if
employee is not retained – includes staff, advertising and other
recruitment and induction costs
Costs:
 Total cost of medical pension up to retirement age (compared to
what would have been paid had the employee left the business)
 Employer’s National Insurance contributions paid whilst employee
on employment retention leave (compared to what would have
been paid had the employee left the business)
 Salary paid while on employment retention leave; although the
cost incurred will depend upon the funding model used (see
Section 4.2)
 Employee’s overheads while on employment retention leave
 Productivity lost while employee on employment retention leave -
but this may be offset by hiring temporary staff, although
productivity may be lost while a new recruit undergoes training
 Additional costs of recruitment and training temporary staff cover
(includes salary and National Insurance contributions)
 Lost investment in training employee who has left the business
Cost of reasonable adjustments for disabled employee. Hasluck
(2006:105) distinguishes between capital and revenue
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expenditures on adjustments. The former would include physical
modifications to the workplace and is a ‘one off’ expenditure that
may be of value to other employees or future (disabled)
employees. The latter covers, for example, personal assistance or
flexible working conditions, and is an on-going cost.
Adjustments are not always required to retain an employee, nor
are they necessarily relatively expensive. A nationally
representative survey of employment establishments conducted in
early 2003 shows that of the 28 per cent of employers who had to
make changes to the workplace or working practices, 68 per cent
said there was a direct cost incurred (Roberts et al., 2004:60 and
63-64). However, in estimating the costs of adjustments in the last
12 months, 19 per cent of these employers said that the cost was
nothing, and a similar percentage (18 per cent) did not know. For
the other employers the cost varied – 31 per cent said it cost
between £1 and £999; 19 per cent £1000 and £4999; and 13 per
cent over £5000. Unfortunately this survey did not distinguish
between adjustments following the recruitment of a disabled
person from those that arise from employment retention.
Nevertheless, a survey of employers who had recruited
participants on the New Deal for Disabled People reveals that 41
per cent of employers had made no adjustments to retain a
disabled worker (Dewson et al., 2005:50). However, this sample is
by definition skewed towards employers who are likely to be
disposed to employing disabled people.
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Survey evidence suggests that employers are more likely to
implement adjustments for existing employees than for recruits,
probably because it is more difficult to avoid doing so (Hasluck,
2006:106).
Meager et al. (2001:43-44) estimate the average cost of an
adjustment to be £722 per disabled employee where the
adjustment was carried out. As not all disabled workers require an
adjustment to be carried out, the average cost across all disabled
employees is lower (£184 per disabled employee). However,
these figures will under-estimate the costs of all potential
adjustments as employers will have rejected some of these as too
costly to implement.
Recent research evidence demonstrates that the majority of
employers who do make adjustment have no particular difficulty in
doing so (Simm et al., 2007); indeed, average costs of workplace
adjustments are low, at £184 per disabled employee in 2001
(Employers Forum on Disability). Moreover, there is evidence that
‘only 4% of disabled people of working age require additional aids
in the workplace or need health related treatment that would
impact on their work’. (CSR Europe, n/d)
Conversely, the loss of trained and experienced employees
moving onto benefits and pensions too soon is expensive, with an
estimate from the UK Post Office that each early retirement on
health grounds costs in the region of £160,000, while studies in the
USA suggest ‘an average return of US$30 on every $1 spent
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accommodating people who become disabled as part of a ‘skill
retention strategy’. (CSR Europe, n/d)
Employers’ costs for adjustments may be offset by Access to
Work.
 Insurance premiums to cover costs of employment retention leave
Pay. However, depends upon funding model adopted –
employment retention leave could be paid by employer, employee
or Government (see Section 4.2)
 Costs of administering employment retention (mainly staff costs)
 Cost of medical assessments, but could be offset by insurance
policy
 Employment retention leave pay. Cost incurred depends upon
funding model – employment retention leave could be paid by
employer, employee or Government. If employer costs, these
might be offset by the cost of Statutory Sick Pay / occupational
sick pay, which might be the same as amount paid for employment
retention leave – so cancelling one another. Costs might be met
by an insurance policy – see also Section 4.2
5.4 Insurer perspective
Our qualitative interviews with insurers suggest that the industry is
‘keen to cost’ employment retention leave insurance as a long term
income protection product. However, insurers also stressed the
importance of managing sickness and absence, arguing that many
employers would need to improve their existing procedures,
particularly in terms of monitoring and notifying sickness and
absence.
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In summary the benefits and costs to insurers are:
Benefits:
 Increased income if funded by employers and/or employees via
(private) insurance scheme
 Lower level of damages that are paid to people pursuing a
personal injury claim for loss of earning (Better Regulation Task
Force, 2004:32)
Cost:
 Administering and marketing of insurance scheme
5.5 Government perspective
The Better Regulation Task Force (2004:32) quote an estimate made
by the Association of British Insurers that in 2003 the increased tax
revenues and benefit savings to the Government of an improvement
in rehabilitation services was £1.3 billion.
In summary, the benefits and costs to the Government are as follows:
Benefits
 Reduction in Incapacity Benefit and Income Support expenditure.
Could also be a reduction in Jobseeker's Allowance expenditure
as some might not be awarded Incapacity Benefit
 Reduction in costs of administering Incapacity Benefit and Income
Support
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 Reductions in expenditures on Housing Benefit and Council Tax
Benefit (although some people’s incomes while on employment
retention leave may be low enough to give entitlement to these
benefits)
 Increases in indirect tax revenues (that is, VAT and duties on
certain commodities such as alcoholic drinks, tobacco and petrol)
because people’s incomes are higher as a result of employment
retention.
 Increases in employees’ National Insurance contributions because
people’s incomes are higher as a result of employment retention.
(In certain circumstances the reasonable adjustments/occupational
health support provided by employers may be an employee benefit
that is liable for employee and employer National Insurance
contributions – see HSE (n.d.))
 Increases in employers’ National Insurance contributions
 Increases in direct tax revenues, because people’s incomes are
higher as a result of employment retention. (In certain
circumstances the reasonable adjustments/occupational health
support provided by employers may be a taxable employee benefit
– see HSE (n.d.))
Costs
 Increase in costs of employment retention leave. Costs
depends upon the funding model used – employment retention
leave could be paid by employer, employee or Government
(see Section 4.2)
 Increase in costs of administering employment retention leave
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 Increase in cost of Working Tax Credit - more people should be
eligible for Working Tax Credit.
 Reduced taxes paid by businesses as a result of increased
provision of occupational health support due to employment
retention leave (Under certain circumstances employers can
deduct expenditure on occupational health support against
business profits see HSE (n.d.) for details).
The impact of increased employment retention on the health service
is difficult to assess. It might lead to increased demand (and hence
increased costs) for services and treatments that help people stay in
employment. The mix of services and treatments used would depend
upon the nature of employee’s condition. In some cases people will
be using a service or treatment that they would have used even if
they were not on employment retention leave, in other cases they will
utilise the service earlier than they would otherwise have done so,
and in some cases they would not have used the service/treatment in
the absence of the introduction of employment retention leave.
Alternatively, employment retention leave might lead to a reduction in
the demand for certain services/treatments. It might mean that some
people will not use, or will use later, services or treatments that they
would otherwise have used, because successful employment
retention alters their need for certain services/treatments.
The net impact of these various outcomes and how they impact on
expenditure on the NHS is unknown. That is, it is unclear whether,
from the Government’s perspective, the introduction of employment
retention leave:
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 Produces a reduction in demand for services/treatments and so a
net saving in NHS expenditures;
 No change in total NHS expenditure, although possibly a change
in the mix of services/treatments used; or
 An increase in demand for NHS services/treatments leading to a
net increase in NHS expenditures.
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6 Who might claim employment retention leave?
6.1 Numbers
The number of people who each year would avail themselves of paid
employment retention leave is difficult to estimate because the
necessary information is not available. Nonetheless, it is possible to
give a range within which the number of employment retention cases
is likely to be located.
Table 6.1 gives various estimates for populations that include people
who are potential uses of employment retention leave. The lowest
estimate in the Table is 25,000 per annum; based on people leaving
work due to work-related illnesses.
The table suggest that the absolute upper limit for an estimate is a
figure less than 118,500 cases per annum. This estimate represents
the number who voluntarily gave up employment for health reasons in
2004-05. However, not all of these cases would be suitable for
employment retention cases, but this proportion is unknown. Given
this uncertainty, if 50 per cent is assumed this would give 59,250. A
figure that is not too dissimilar from the estimated 62,000 derived
from Incapacity Benefit data. This estimate is based on the numbers
of claimants flowing onto Incapacity Benefit short term higher rate
(that is, what many people claim after 28 weeks of sick leave) minus
those flowing onto Incapacity Benefit longer-term rate (that is, the
higher rate paid after 12 months on incapacity). Combining these two
figures would give 60,625 as an upper estimate. Thus the number of
potential Rehabilitation cases is likely to fall between 25,000 and
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60,625 per annum. This range is a crude estimate, based on
considerably less than ideal sources, but gives an indication of likely
demand.
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Table 6.1 Number/proportion and sources for estimates of number of employment retention
cases
Number/Proportion Comment Source
25,000 people leaving work due to work-related illnesses per
annum. Source unclear but may exclude work-related
injuries
John Robertson, MP;
Hansard, 13 March
2007, col. 156
<1% published RNIB estimate, but population base used is
unknown
RNIB, 1994, Disability
Leave: a guide for
employers, quoted in
Paschkes-Bell (1996)
0.3% of employees in clerical work are at risk of developing a
disability in a year
UNUM Ltd, quoted in
Paschkes-Bell (1996)
62,000 the difference between the number flowing on to Authors own
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Incapacity Benefit short tem higher rate and Incapacity
Benefit long term rate in 2004. Not all of the claimants
would be suitable for employment retention leave
calculation using DWP
Incapacity Benefit
statistics
3.6% (118,500) voluntarily gave up employment for health reasons in
2004-05. An unknown percentage would have benefited
from the scheme had it been implemented
ONS (2006) Labour
market review, 2006,
Table 2.9
3% of those in work become ‘disabled’ each year. Here a
broad ADL-limited definition of disabled is used: ‘Does
your health in any way limit your daily activities compared
to most people of you age?’ This estimate will include the
self-employed and employees
Burchardt (2000:19)
using British
Household Survey
Panel
2.6% (608,000) who become DDA disabled and remain so for at least 1 to
13 weeks
Burchardt (2003b:9)
using the Labour
Force Survey
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6.2 Employment retention
Although workers defined as disabled under the Disability
Discrimination Act have higher sickness absence rates compared to
non-disabled workers (5.9 per cent compared to 2.5 per cent;
(Barham and Begum, 2005:153)), Burchardt (2003:11) shows that
there is a striking difference between those who become disabled
according to the Disability Discrimination Act and those who start a
Statutory Sick Pay/Incapacity Benefit spell. Whilst five per cent of
those becoming DDA disabled initially leave employment, 23 per cent
of the Statutory Sick Pay/Incapacity Benefit group do so. Moreover,
this differential is maintained over time; at nine to 12 months after
onset, the proportions are 13 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. It
is possible that those claiming Statutory Sick Pay/Incapacity Benefit
are in general more severely impaired.
The retention rate of those classed as DDA disabled is similar to that
of all of those in employment; ‘… suggesting that the onset of DDA
disability may not in itself be an additional risk factor’ (Burchardt,
2003b:11). However, the retention rates of those who become DDA
disabled and are off work are similar to those for the Statutory Sick
Pay/Incapacity Benefit group (Burchardt, 2003b:11). (The latter in
turn have lower retention rates than for the general population.)
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7 Issues
In preparing this report a number of issues emerged that require
further consideration and/or will affect the design of a statutory
employment retention leave policy. These issues are whether
voluntary work should be permitted during the leave period, the level
of provision of occupational health services, the disclosure of
disability to an employer and work colleagues and the commercial
viability of the private insurance funding model. These issues are
briefly considered in this chapter.
7.1 Activities during employment retention leave
Our qualitative work suggests that it may be desirable to allow
employees to engage in voluntary work and related activities during
periods of employment retention leave. This may be particularly
important for employees with mental health problems. The qualitative
interviews with Mental Health Service users suggests that voluntary
work could support employment retention through the provision of a
non- pressured work environment, enable the maintenance of work
related skills, and counter social isolation (see also DWP, 2004, and
Warner, 2002). A report compiled by the Disability Employment
Coalition (RNIB, August 2004) also identifies voluntary work as an
important element in extending disabled peoples’ access to the job
market. While this would clearly not be appropriate for all employees,
voluntary activities are potentially an important part of the package of
measures to support employment retention.
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The key issue requiring further consideration is who funds the time an
individual spends doing voluntary work in situations where the work is
part of the process of returning to paid employment – is it the
employee, the employer or the Government?
7.2 Provision of occupational health services by
employers
The effectiveness of a statutory employment retention scheme is
partly dependent upon the provision of occupational health services
by employers. Whilst the level of demand that the introduction of the
scheme might generate is difficult to gauge, it is possible that there is
insufficient provision of occupational health services. A telephone
survey of companies revealed that in the UK13 (IOM, 2002:44-45)):
 Only 15 per cent of companies provide occupational health
support using a ‘broad’ definition that covers hazard identification,
risk management and provision of information.
 Only three per cent provide occupational health support using a
‘stringent’ definition that covers hazard identification, risk
management, provision of information, modifying work activities,
training on health-related activities, measuring workplace hazards
and monitoring trends in health.
The proportion of companies providing occupational health support
increases with company size, as measured by number of employees.
For example, using the broad definition of occupational health the
proportion increases from 11 per cent for micro-companies (those
13 Weighted results for the UK.
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employing 10 people or less) to 71 per cent for large firms (those
employing more than 250 people). This raises questions about the
ability of smaller sized firms to deliver effectively rehabilitation
services and support to those on employment retention leave.
However, a quarter of businesses (27 per cent) (using the broad
definition of occupation health) would be willing to share their
occupational health services (on a chargeable basis) with other local
firms.
For both definitions the percentages for companies varies by
industrial sector; they are very low in the retail sector (eight and one
per cent, respectively) and highest in mining and quarrying (38 per
cent and 18 per cent, respectively).
The paucity of occupational health coverage has been recognised by
the Government. The recent key strategy document, Improving the
life chances of disabled people, included the recommendation that
the Department of Health and the Department for Work and Pensions
should from 2008 onwards increase the supply of occupation health
provision and encourage employers to provide occupational health
services (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005).
These recommendations build upon earlier recommendations made
by the Better Regulation Task Force’s report Better routes to redress,
which the Government accepted (BRTF, 2004; DCA, 2004). The
Better Regulation Task Force called for a review of NHS-provided
rehabilitation services and for mechanisms to be developed that
would facilitate employee’s early access to rehabilitation services.
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In part the Government’s response to these proposals is outlined in
the Department for Work and Pensions’ Framework for Vocational
Guidance.
7.3 Disclosure of disability
For people meeting the Disability Discrimination Act definition of
disability, some will accept the label ‘disabled’, perceiving it ‘central to
their personal identity’ and others will reject the notion (Grewal et al.,
2002: 52). Disabled employees are not obliged to inform their
employer of their disability. Although being open with an employer
about an impairment is one effective strategy to ‘thrive and survive’ in
the workplace (Roulstone et al., 2003). People could view
themselves not as disabled but as being ill, simply getting old or not
as ‘worse off’ as others (Grewal et al., 2002: 54). Some said they
were not disabled because they were ‘fit and healthy’. The research
also included in-depth interviews and discussion groups with disabled
and non-disabled people. This showed that the term ‘disabled’ can
also be rejected because it is too broad, and does not accurately
reflect a person’s identity. These people preferred to consider
themselves to be, for instance, blind or dyslexic rather than ‘disabled’.
(These findings are also broadly supported by qualitative research by
Molloy et al., 2003.)
For some, being classed as ‘disabled’ is stigmatising. Certainly some
of the employers interviewed face-to-face in the research by Roberts
et al., (2004: 34) felt that ‘disability’ can have negative connotations
for some people and carry a degree of stigma, a point that is borne
out by recent research in which employers said that
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‘misunderstanding about disability in general’ was a barrier to
employing disabled people (Vision Twentyone, 2007:2).
Not knowing that an employee is disabled as defined by the Act does
not necessarily remove the obligations placed on employers by the
Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Employers can be held to have
discriminated directly or on grounds of treating a disabled person less
favourable compared to other people (unless the treatment is
justified), even if they do not know that the person concerned has a
disability (DRC, 2004; Leverton, 2002). However, until the employer
becomes aware of the condition, or could be reasonably expected to
be aware of it, s/he does not have to make any reasonable
adjustments to accommodate a person’s disability (S6(6) DDA 1995).
Disclosure may be more likely if job applicants/employees feel
comfortable about giving information about their disabilities (DRC,
2004: 27). This is more likely to occur if employers explain why the
information is required and if employers ‘genuinely value disabled
employees and is using the information gathered to create positive
change’ (ibid.).
Disclosure can be an issue with medical advice and reports. An
employer can commission a medical report from an independent
expert, but the employee can then refuse permission for the report to
be passed to their employer (Leverton, 2002: 25).
There is also the issue of disclosure of a person’s disability by the
employer to other employees (DRC, 2004: 141). Telling other
employees about someone’s disability could be discriminating if
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similar information would not be revealed in similar circumstances.
However, some information about a disability may have to be given to
a supervisor or co-workers in order to implement a reasonable
adjustment. In these circumstances it would be good practice to
obtain the consent of the disabled worker in advance of informing
other employees.
Under the Data Protection Act employers have a duty to safeguard
the confidentiality of any employee’s personal or medical information
(DRC, 2005a). If an employee wishes to keep their disability or
health condition confidential, disclosure is only permissible when it is
absolutely necessary, the employee has consented and it helps the
person undertake their job.
7.4 Insurers’ perspective
The qualitative work highlights several important issues for the private
model (see Section 4.2.2). Key issues include commercial viability
and the broader policy context around equality issues.
Insurers highlighted the extent to which employment retention leave
would be an insurable risk in the context of demographic change, and
some insurers argued that such insurance would not be commercially
viable. An increasingly elderly population is likely to include greater
numbers of disabled people, which, in the context of new age
discrimination legislation, has the potential to significantly increase
the financial risk.
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Nevertheless, there does not appear to be evidence that large
numbers of employees would require employment retention leave;
moreover, when this was required, it would be in employer’s interests
to actively support and promote rehabilitation (including all the other
measures available under reasonable adjustments).
Some insurers argued that employment retention leave would be
more likely to be insurable if employers were known to be managing
such a scheme well. For a scheme to be well managed, early
intervention would be critical; work would need to be seen as part of
the rehabilitative process, and all stakeholders would need to be ‘on
board’ and proactive.
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8 Conclusion and Recommendations
‘In a modern world where rising dependency ratios and global
market forces place an ever greater burden on those of working
age in supporting others, neither our economy nor our society
as a whole can afford for us to stand back and allow people to
be written off.’
(DWP, DH, HSE, 2005:2)
8.1 The case for employment retention leave
There is a strong case for the introduction of a statutory employment
retentions policy in the UK.
Employment retention leave may be seen as a logical extension of
contemporary government policies aimed at promoting the
engagement of individuals in paid employment. Recent policy
measures have emphasised the importance of work as a route out of
poverty, and in promoting social inclusion.
The economic and social costs of failing to support policies that
optimise conditions for disabled people in employment are high. A
report in December 2006 for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found
that the poverty rate for disabled adults is twice that for non-disabled
adults, (a higher difference than a decade ago). The report goes on
to say:
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‘it is also clear that disabled people face formidable
barriers in finding work. The most striking evidence of this
is that graduates with a work-limiting disability have a
higher chance of being out of, but wanting, work than a
non-disabled adult who has no qualifications at all.
Neither a willingness to work, nor self-improvement
through education, are therefore sufficient to give disabled
adults anything like the same economic prospects as their
non-disabled peers’.
(Palmer et al, 2006:16)
Employment retention leave should be seen in the context of the
whole range of existing measures to support disabled people in
employment. This includes making full use of under exploited
resources such as the Access to Work Fund. In comparison with
other European countries, Britain has a low rate of sickness absence.
In 2005, a lower proportion of working time in Britain was lost to
short-term absence than in any other country except Denmark; and 
only Austria, Germany and Ireland lost a lower proportion of working
time to long-term absence. In this context, Britain has a problem of
‘presenteeism’ – that is, employees who say that they have gone to
work when they have been too ill to do so, a finding that applies to
employees in every social class, and across all regions (TUC,
2005:3).
Our qualitative work highlighted the importance of good monitoring
procedures for effective management of sickness and absence.
Evidence from employers suggests that although many are aware of
gaps in their monitoring systems, even in organisations with a
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positive and supportive attitude to disabled employees, monitoring of
the use of, for example, the Access to Work fund, or even employees
who are DDA disabled, is poor or non-existent. Better monitoring
systems (or, in many cases, the introduction of monitoring) would
help to proactively support disabled employees in the workplace
(DWP 2004: 25).
The absence of robust monitoring systems means that there are
limitations to the analysis of the benefits and costs of retaining
disabled employees. Nevertheless, based on existing evidence, it
appears likely that a relatively small proportion of employees would
use employment retention leave. Moreover, as the TUC report cited
above argues:
‘All employers under-report sickness absence, and one of
the first things that happens when an organisation starts
devoting more resources to absence management is that
record-keeping improves ‘ (TUC, 2005:6)
There may, as discussed in earlier sections of this report, be some
particular challenges for small businesses in implementing
employment retention leave. Nevertheless, these challenges are
potentially manageable. A survey focusing on the retention and
reintegration of disabled employees of small businesses in the
Greater London area (with fewer than 50 employees) found that
employers would welcome a ‘single, responsive, business orientated
service that can help to resolve difficulties as and when they arise’
(TriNova Ltd, 2005:68) together with tailored packages of support
with a ‘menu of options’, including support with workforce health, HR
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management, specialist job retention support and workforce
development.
Finally, any employment retention scheme would have to be
statutory, because a voluntary scheme is likely to have a low take-up,
especially amongst small and medium sized businesses. Indeed,
there is (regretfully) a need for universal employer compliance with
(existing) disability legislation. For example, a recent survey of
compliance with legislation under the Disability Equality Duty found
that although most public bodies did have their Disability Equality
Scheme in place by the deadline of 4 December 2006, 27 per cent
did not (TUC, 2007).
8.2 Implementation of employment retention leave
A statutory employment retention policy could be introduced by using
secondary or primary legislation.
There are two potential routes to implementing the proposals
discussed in this report through secondary legislation. The first is
through issuing guidance under section 53A of the Disability
Discrimination Act. Through this route, the Secretary of State could
request the Disability Rights Commission to prepare a code of
practice on employment retention.
Although guidance may lead some employers to amend their
practices, there would be no legal obligation imposed on individuals
(although a court or tribunal would be required to take the guidance
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into account). For this reason the issuing of further guidance on
employment retention is not proposed.
The second potential route would be through the enactment of new
legislation. Under the Welfare Reform Act 2007, the Secretary of
State can issue regulations to implement aspects of the Employment
and Support Allowance. The 13 week assessment period during the
claim process for Employment and Support Allowance might make
job retention a possibility for some claimants. However, this
secondary legislation could not be used to introduce a general right to
employment retention leave. Further, only an unknown proportion of
potential employment retention cases will be affected, and would
exclude others, including individuals who move from sick leave to
retirement on the grounds of incapacity, or who are ineligible for
Employment and Support Allowance.
The final option would be to introduce a statutory right to employment
retention leave. Although this would be a longer process than either
of the secondary legislation options, it is the surest way of ensuring
that workers are given access to employment retention leave (and
associated assessments). The introduction of a Bill to establish a
right to employment retention leave is recommended. This might
potentially be implemented as an element of the proposed
Employment Simplification Bill announced in the Prime Minister’s
Queens Speech (11 July 2007).
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8.3 Funding employment retention leave
The lack of ‘hard’ quantifiable data on the benefits and costs make it
difficult to assess which of the three broad funding models outlined in
Chapter 4 should be recommended as the ‘best’ funding model. The
three funding models have different advantages and disadvantages
and politically and financially have different appeal to the main groups
that could be affected by the introduction of the policy – employees,
employers, insurers and Government.
The research team’s tentative recommendation is that a version of
the mixed funding model should be adopted for paying for
employment retention leave. The main reason for suggesting the
mixed funding model is that it shares the costs amongst the
beneficiaries. It also avoids some of the (political) risks associated
with the other funding models, namely:
 Historically, both Labour and Conservative Governments have
moved away from contributory benefits and towards move
targeting of benefits to those most in need. Arguably, a funding
model based only on National Insurance contributions is unlikely to
gain much political support (c.f. Section 4.2.1). In addition, the
social insurance model has a number of key disadvantages,
notably that women might not gain full entitlement to the leave
because of their work patterns.
 In the context of a fiscally tight public spending round, Government
is unlikely to agree to fund a solely social assistance, or means-
tested version of the policy (c.f. Section 4.2.1).
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 To ensure compliance with the legislation, any employer insurance
funded scheme would probably have to oblige firms to take out
insurance cover. As a consequence employers may hire only
individuals who are non-disabled, or apply health criteria to
potential employees. Except where labour markets were buoyant,
and employers might otherwise face labour shortages, the
introduction of compulsory insurance for employers to cover
employment retention might (further) disadvantage (existing)
disabled people in the labour market.
 The introduction of compulsory private insurance for employment
retention for employees is not seen as politically feasible – it would
be depicted as a ‘hidden’ tax increase.
Nevertheless, if assessment of employees who would benefit from
employment retention leave was mandatory, there is a potentially
viable option in a similar model to Maternity Leave, as discussed in
Section 4.2.3 of this report. Any assessment under this model likely
to have to be mandatory because otherwise the State might be
reluctant to fund its share of the costs unless there was evidence that
leave was justified. It is possible that such an assessment could be
‘certified’ by say a GP in similar to the certification of sickness
absence. Such a process would minimise administrative costs and
be straightforward and easy to understand by employees and
employers. The success of this model would be contingent upon
good management of potential employment retention leave cases.
Assessment would need to happen quickly, and clear policies and
procedures in place to manage the leave effectively. There are,
however, examples of good practice that suggest that this would be
manageable.
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ANNEX 1
Examples of adjustments to working arrangements include:
 allowing a phased return to work;
 changing individual's working hours;
 providing help with transport to and from work;
 arranging home working, providing a safe environment can be
maintained;
 allowing an employee to be absent from work for rehabilitation
treatment.
Examples of adjustments to premises include:
 moving tasks to more accessible areas;
 making alterations to premises.
Examples of adjustments to a job include:
 providing new or modifying existing equipment and tools;
 modifying work furniture;
 providing additional training;
 modifying instructions or reference manuals;
 modifying work patterns and management systems;
 arranging telephone conferences to reduce travel;
 providing a buddy or mentor;
 providing supervision;
 reallocating work within the employee's team;
 providing alternative work.
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Source: Health and Safety Executive, 2007, ‘Managing Sickness
Absence and Return to Work: Workplace Adjustments’,
Retrieved from:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/sicknessabsence/reasonableadjustments.ht
m on 2 May 2007
92
ANNEX 2
The DDA states that a person is disabled if they have ‘a
physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term
adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day to day activities'.
For the purposes of the Act the effect of the impairment has lasted or
is likely to last for at least 12 months. Normal day-to-day activities
include eating, washing, walking. A normal day-to-day activity must
affect one of the 'capacities' listed in the Act which include mobility,
manual dexterity, speech, hearing, seeing and memory. The Act
excludes some conditions (such as fire setting and hay fever).
However, people with a ‘past disability’ or a progressive condition are
covered by the scope of the Act. Under the terms of the DDA, people
with HIV, cancer and multiple sclerosis are covered by the DDA from
the point of diagnosis, rather than from the point when the condition
has some adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-
day activities.
Source: Directgov, ‘Definition of ‘disability’ under the DDA’,
Retrieved from:
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/DisabledPeople/RightsAndObligations/Di
sabilityRights/DG_4001069 on 3 May 2007.)
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